Patrina Edwards v. Fox Chase Cancer Center by unknown
2020 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-14-2020 
Patrina Edwards v. Fox Chase Cancer Center 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020 
Recommended Citation 
"Patrina Edwards v. Fox Chase Cancer Center" (2020). 2020 Decisions. 371. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2020/371 
This April is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 2020 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
  
         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 19-3425 
___________ 
 
PATRINA EDWARDS, 
   Appellant 
 
v. 
 
FOX CHASE CANCER CENTER 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
(E.D. Pa. Civil Action No. 2:19-cv-00164) 
District Judge: Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 3, 2020 
Before:  AMBRO, GREENAWAY, Jr., and PORTER, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 14, 2020) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
Pro se appellant Patrina Edwards appeals the District Court’s dismissal of her 
complaint in favor of defendant Fox Chase Cancer Center.  Edwards brought claims of 
 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et 
seq., the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq., and the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“AEDA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.  For the 
reasons that follow, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
Edwards, who is African-American and over 40 years old, began working for 
defendant as a Certified Nursing Assistant in August 2017.  In April 2018, Edwards 
complained to supervisory staff that a nurse, whom Edwards believes is white, was not 
completing assignments during her shift.  In June 2018, Edwards’ manager told her that 
she did not fit with the chemistry of her unit, and that same month, a nurse in Edwards’ 
unit drove her car in an aggressive manner behind Edwards’ car while leaving the work 
parking lot.  In August 2018, Edwards had difficulty logging onto her computer at work, 
leading her to believe that her log-in accessibility had been tampered with to sabotage her 
work performance.  Edwards generally alleged that she was undermined at work and that 
communication in her unit was difficult.  Edwards fainted at work twice in September 
2018 after she felt dizzy.  Edwards then took a leave of absence for several months, citing 
stress at work.  Soon after she returned in December 2018, Edwards resigned from her 
position, generally claiming harassment and stress. 
Edwards filed a complaint in the District Court in January 2019.1  The District 
Court dismissed her complaint after screening it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
 
1  Edwards filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission after she resigned; she was subsequently issued a right-to-sue letter. 
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§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), noting that her complaint contained no factual allegations of 
discrimination, and granted her leave to amend.  After Edwards filed an amended 
complaint, defendant moved to dismiss.  The District Court granted its motion, 
concluding that granting Edwards further leave to amend would be futile.  Edwards 
timely appealed. 
We agree with the District Court’s dismissal of Edwards’ claims.2  Edwards makes 
no arguments on appeal regarding the merits of her claims.3  See United States v. Pelullo, 
399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[A]n appellant’s failure to identify or argue an issue 
in his opening brief constitutes waiver of that issue on appeal”).  As the District Court 
thoroughly explained, Edwards could not state a prima facie case of discrimination under 
Title VII, the ADA, or the ADEA because she did not identify any adverse employment 
action that was taken against her under circumstances that could suggest discriminatory 
intent on the part of her employer based on her race, age, or disability.  See St. Mary’s 
Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506-07 (1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. 
 
2  We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s dismissal of Edwards’ claims.  See Fowler v. 
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009).  In our review, “we accept all 
factual allegations as true [and] construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiff.”  Warren Gen. Hosp. v. Amgen Inc., 643 F.3d 77, 84 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation 
omitted).  Dismissal is appropriate “if, accepting all well-pleaded allegations in the 
complaint as true and viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, a court 
finds that [the] plaintiff’s claims lack facial plausibility.”  Id. 
 
3  To the extent that Edwards challenges the District Court’s decisions denying her 
motions for appointment of counsel, the District Court did not abuse its discretion; her 
claims lack arguable merit.  See Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 158 (3d Cir. 1993). 
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Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 
802 (1973); Hohider v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 574 F.3d 169, 186 (3d Cir. 2009); 
Sarullo v. U.S. Postal Serv., 352 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2003) (per curiam).  Finally, 
because the District Court’s first dismissal order explained how Edwards could state a 
prima facie case of discrimination under the relevant standards, the District Court did not 
err in denying Edwards leave to file another amended complaint.  See Grayson v. 
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 
